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AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING
THE REGULATORY STATE. By Cass R. Sunstein.t Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Univ. Press. 1990. Pp. xi, 284. Cloth,
$25.00.
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRffiCAL INTRODUCTION. Daniel A. Farber2 and Philip P. Frickey.3 Chicago,
11.: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 159. Cloth, $34.95.
Paper, $13.95.
Herbert Hovenkamp4

These two provocative volumes, the first more constructive, the
second more analytic, deal with some of the most important and
vexing questions about policy making in our democratic, capitalist
state. These questions concern government's ability and ultimate
entitlement to interfere with the unrestrained market in furtherance
of the public interest.
Cass R. Sunstein has written a short but far-ranging book that
is certain to set the tone for many debates over the appropriate role
of the welfare and administrative state in the aftermath of the Warren Era "rights revolution." He joins issue with many of the 1980s
ideas that are hostile toward the regulatory state, particularly from
the law and economics movement, the public choice movement, and
the accompanying policy revolution that characterized the Reagan
Administration. He then attempts to reconstruct and defend a vision of the liberal, interventionist state from most of these attacks.
Sunstein begins with an all too brief history of government regulation, focusing chiefly on the rise of the modem regulatory state
during the New Deal, and continuing through the "rights revolution" of the 1960s and 1970s. For Sunstein as for others, the New
Deal is a watershed in the history of regulation. The regulatory
regimes established during the New Deal collectively formed a
"wholesale assault on the system of common law ordering" and
transferred to the federal executive branch much of the regulatory
control that had previously been the domain of the states and the
courts. Sunstein generally applauds both these developments,
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although he has some reservations about particular regulatory
excursions.
He then re-examines the basic economic and political rationales for regulation and the most telling criticisms of it. In the process he develops a model of regulation that is sympathetic to its
goals and also accounts for its diversity.
Sunstein generally rejects attacks on regulation "that are
rooted in modem welfare economics and in pre-New Deal principles of private right." His principal complaint about welfare economics is that by its nature economics assumes that individual
preferences precede society and the State. But an important purpose of Madisonian government, and thus of regulation, is to form
preferences. When viewed in this fashion, the history of regulatory
interference with the market gives much greater cause for optimism.
At the same time, however, Sunstein's survey of federal regulatory
programs finds ample evidence of failure as well as success. The
lesson to be learned is thus not that regulation is inherently bad, but
that it is vulnerable to misinterpretation and abuse. Law makers,
especially courts, must respond to this knowledge in such a way as
to make regulation work, and to minimize the opportunities for
harmful self-dealing.
One frustrating part of Sunstein's book is an extremely short
section responding to the powerful critiques of post-New Deal regulation during the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Sunstein dismisses
in a few sentences the great debate at the boundaries of welfare economics about whether welfare must be measured strictly in terms of
current, individual, market-revealed preferences, or whether other
indicia of happiness or well-being can be taken into account. In the
process of making this argument, however, Sunstein suggests an important point: most of the economic attacks on the regulatory state
rest on a premise that restricts the meaning of "welfare" to that
which it has within neoclassical economics-a regime in which subjective utilities are presumed not to be interpersonally comparable
and the meaning of "welfare" is identified with revealed market
preference. However, most of these arguments fall apart when one
permits broader measures of welfare, drawing upon data from a
wider variety of sources and from disciplines other than economics.
Sunstein also rejects in a short space the contractarian argument that legislative interference with voluntary market transactions is justified only when the changes are supported by unanimous
consent. Sunstein suggests that this position depends on a presumption that the existing distribution is "prepolitical, or just, or supported by unanimous consent at some privileged earlier stage." Of
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course, contractarian arguments may depend on no such presumption, but simply on notions of reliance, or alternatively, that no matter how unjust or impoverished the current state, only unanimous
consent provides reliable evidence that welfare is improved under
any alternative state. Sunstein also seeks to counter the broadbased economic argument that regulation is nothing more than rent
seeking by noting that an extremely vibrant liberal tradition in the
United States suggests that much governmental participation is not
rent-seeking at all but good citizenship-people seek regulatory
rules because they believe the rules are in the public interest.
Sunstein then concludes that the case against the minimalist
state and in favor of regulation is strong, and rests on three fundamental points. First, individual preferences are not simply given, or
inherent in the human constitution, but are determined by the existing legal regime. As a result, defending the existing, antistatist
legal regime by reference to individual preferences involves us in a
circular argument. Second, regulatory programs are much more
necessary than some economists believe to solve free rider and collective action problems. Third, on other grounds than number one,
private preferences need not always be respected, since they can and
should be overridden by the collective will; further, preferences are
determined by what the market makes available. For example,
some tribes of American Indians placed only a low value on alcoholic beverages offered to them by European traders until the traders succeeded in establishing a "consumption history."
Sunstein's assessment of why and how regulation fails begins
with a survey that finds wide disparities in the relative success stories of various regulatory regimes. Sunstein cites rule making by
the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as having particularly
unimpressive records. But there are more successes than failures in
his story. Moreover, the failures can be explained. In some cases
the regulation was badly-intentioned from the beginning-usually
nothing more than a wealth transfer passed at the behest of a rentseeking interest group. Other cases can be explained by a failure to
diagnose the problem or by rigid legislation that either constrains
private firms' ability to find the optimal solution or submits them to
an unrealistic timetable. He cites automobile emission control standards as an example of such difficulties. Other failures result from
unanticipated consequences or system-wide effects that result from
regulation that was intended to be local or specific. Related to this
is a failure of one set of regulatory statutes to coordinate with another set. Still other regulatory failures result from changed cir-
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cumstance or obsolescence: the regulation may have been well
designed for the problem that was perceived to exist at the time the
regime was passed. However, subsequently either the problem
changed or information has become available that has changed our
perspective about the problem.
In addition to these numerous causes for the conceptual failure
of regulatory regimes, Sunstein cites several instances of what he
calls "implementation failure" -situations where the regulatory
statute may have been well designed for the problem confronted,
but the agency delegated the task of establishing and enforcing the
regulatory regime has not performed the task well.
The second half of Sunstein's book is concerned with issues of
statutory interpretation, designed to enable both legislative drafters
and courts-primarily the latter-to establish regulatory regimes
that work in the public interest. To this end, Sunstein concludes
that the interpretive task "inevitably requires courts (and others) to
develop and rely on background principles that cannot be tied to
any legislative enactment." However, reliance on such principles is
both inevitable and "a potentially valuable part of the fabric of
modern public law."
Sunstein proposes principles of statutory interpretation
designed to account for regulatory failure without being hostile to
the general enterprise of regulation. His basic disagreement with
the strictures imposed by public choicers on statutory interpretation
appears to be that they begin the process with unabashed hostility
toward most regulation in general. This hostility leads public
choice to such conclusions as that legislation should be viewed as no
more than contracts, or "deals" between the legislature and special
interest groups, in which the interest groups are entitled to get what
they bargained for and no more.
The centerpiece of Professor Sunstein's book is chapter five,
which presents a set of interpretive principles for the reconstructed
regulatory state, designed to take many of the criticisms of public
choice and the general doctrine of regulatory failure seriously, but
not so seriously so as to undermine all trust in regulation. Some of
the principles are orthodox and seem quite uncontroversial: if the
federal government wishes to preempt state law, it should state so
clearly; statutes that raise constitutional doubts should be construed
narrowly. Others are more venturesome: "statutes that embody
mere interest-group deals should be narrowly construed," and
"[c]ourts should construe statutes so as to increase the likelihood
that decisions will be made by officials who are politically accountable and highly visible." Clearly, such principles place rather high
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burdens on courts, and require them to look far beyond the text.
Other proposed principles are far ranging, with implications that
can only be imagined, and with a content that is frustratingly ambiguous. For example, Sunstein urges that the law that one must
show a discriminatory intent to make out an equal protection clause
violation should give way to the view that a statute need have only a
disproportionate, discriminatory impact to "raise constitutional
doubts." Certainly Sunstein would not argue that all statutes with a
disparate impact are unconstitutional. So the phrase "raise constitutional doubts" must mean that some will survive and some will
not-but this leaves an extraordinary amount of room for judicial
discretion.
Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey's book is a first rate introduction to the public choice literature for someone who does not have a
technical background in economics and who looks at public choice
through a lawyer's eyes. The entire thrust of Law and Public
Choice is that there is something that can be characterized as a "jurisprudence" of public choice: that the public choice literature has
something important to say to legal policy makers such as legislators and judges. Not all of those engaged in public choice inquiries
would agree with this proposition. Many regard public choice as a
purely theoretical endeavor that has or should have little obvious
impact on legal policy making, at least at this stage. But Farber and
Frickey are correct and the critics wrong. Neoclassical economists
in general have disdained applied economics-and the application
of economics to legal policy generally takes the form of applied economics. If public choice as an enterprise is worth carrying on in
some sense different than, say, chess is worth carrying on-not
merely because it is fun and intellectually stimulating, but because it
helps us to conduct our affairs better-then the admixture of law
and public choice is inevitable.
Farber and Frickey's opening illustration suggests one of the
most pervasive problems in the public choice literature: its uncritical readiness, even enthusiasm, to accept public choice theories as
an explanation for certain phenomena without considering the alternatives very seriously. The authors cite a series of studies which
over an extended period asked people the same question: "Would
you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves, rather than for the benefit of all the people?" In 1964 fewer than one-third answered yes, but by 1982 sixty
percent did. One might look at that evidence in a variety of ways.
Farber and Frickey appear to follow the public choice consensus in
regarding it as proof of a general, increasing cynicism about govern-
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ment, which implicitly reveals the need for some theory to explain
why government so often works poorly. But there are alternatives.
For example, one might observe that 1964 was the high point of
President Lyndon B. Johnson's popularity, while 1982 was mid-way
through the first Reagan administration. Perhaps people in general
are more cynical about government during Republican administrations than during Democratic administrations. The numbers also
say nothing about whether this change in attitude is linear or cyclical. Did we start with some very high number-perhaps at the time
of the Revolution-which has been declining ever since? Mancur
Olson's thesis, that nations begin with good government but gradually fall victim to special interest groups, would suggest this. Alternatively, would the numbers have been low after, say, the Teapot
Dome Scandal and Watergate, but high after Appomattox or the
end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term?
The numbers also fail to say much about people's perceptions
with respect to government intervention in the market. 1964 was
near the high point of regulatory liberalism and the emergent
"Great Society" of the Kennedy-Johnson years, when the Warren
Court was in its ascendancy and agency regulation had not yet been
debunked very much in the popular literature. By 1982 the deregulation movement, which had begun during the Carter administration, was well underway. Perhaps the cynicism expressed in these
numbers really expresses a negative reaction to government withdrawal from certain areas of economic activity-a prominent part
of Reagan campaign rhetoric-rather than a negative response to
affirmative government intervention. In short, the numbers may
prove precisely the opposite of what they are intended to prove.
Perhaps people as a group feel best about government when it has
expansive wealth transfer programs whose articulated goals are to
eliminate poverty, democratize higher education, and eliminate discrimination. On the other hand, they equate deregulation-{)r the
government withdrawal from certain areas and re-entrustment of
these to the market-with special interest legislation.
In a short space Farber and Frickey review the recent history
of public choice thinking, and then present chapters on the two
main branches of public choice theory. One branch owes its origins
to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consents and Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action,6 and is
devoted mainly to the study of interest group organizing and activities, voter behavior, and various phenomena that have become an
5.
6.
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almost inherent part of the legislative process, such as log-rolling,
committees with powerful agenda-setting chairs, and the like. The
second branch of public choice is commonly identified with Arrow's
General Possibility Theorem, and is concerned with determining
mathematically the conditions under which democratic voting can
produce efficient, stable outcomes. To date, the first branch of public choice literature has had a greater impact on policy than the
Arrovian literature has, and the coverage of this introductory volume reflects that influence.
After this presentation, the Farber-Frickey book turns to two
broad issues where public choice and public law have managed to
find each other. The first concerns judicial review of economic regulation. The second is the general issue of statutory interpretation.
Farber and Frickey discuss the work of a small but influential
group of legal scholars who are eager to use public choice as the
basis for a broad revision of the federal constitution. This revision
would basically reverse the attitude that the Supreme Court has
taken toward economic regulation since the Court Packing controversy of 1937, and restore a regime of economic scrutiny somewhat
akin to the regime we know today as the Lochner Era. The vehicle
of choice for this transformation is not the due process clause as it
was in Lochner v. New York (1905), however, but most often the
takings clause of the fifth amendment. Likewise, while the Lochner
Supreme Court articulated its concerns in terms of a liberty of contract, the central articulated concern today is property rights.
In brief, public choice theory teaches that small, single-minded
interest groups will have their way with legislatures and compel special interest legislation that will transfer wealth away from others
for the special interest group's benefit. The purpose of the takings
clause (as well as some other clauses) of the Constitution is to prevent this from happening. Thus courts should look closely at
wealth transfers that benefit special interest groups. By contrast,
"where the beneficiaries [of legislation] are substantially more diffuse than those regulated by a statute," no taking should be found.
Statutes in this latter category are not likely to be the product of
rent seeking or special interest capture.
This public choice approach to the takings clause stands the
traditional liberal view of government interference with private
property precisely on its head. Under the traditional theory a court
considered whether the group victimized by a statute challenged
under the takings clause was unique (that is, having interests that
the community at large did not share), and relatively isolated in the
political process. If so, group members might be branded as the
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victims of an unconstitutional attempt to transfer wealth away from
them for the benefit of the public at large, or at least of some larger
and more powerful interest group. This view of takings jurisprudence followed closely the Warren Court's development of the
equal protection clause to protect "discrete and insular" minorities
from unjust discrimination at the hands of the majority. The purpose of the takings clause was to "spread the cost of operating the
governmental apparatus throughout the society rather than imposing it upon some small segment of it. " 7 In short, in liberal takings
jurisprudence the isolated minority is the victim; in public choice
jurisprudence the well-defined, small minority becomes the rentseeker, who robs the much more diffuse general public of its property rights.
The problem faced by the "applied" legal policy maker is that
each version of the takings story seems to account for some situations where we might wish to strike down a statute, and neither
version accounts for everything. Suppose a city council representing ten thousand people passes an ordinance preventing any development on the land of a half dozen neighboring property owners, in
order to protect the view from a public park across those property
owners' land. Would the liberal view (taking) or the public choice
view (no taking) be more sensible? Suppose the only three apartment building owners in a town lobbied for and obtained an ordinance preventing any further apartment buildings from being built.
Would the liberal view (no taking) or the public choice view (taking) be more sensible? Simply put, not all forms of legislation addressable under the rubric of takings fall into one category or the
other, although the liberal view seems to explain more recent
Supreme Court decisions than does the public choice view. Further, in many cases a court would likely not be able to distinguish
one kind of "legislative failure" from the other.
Farber and Frickey conclude with a fairly deep skepticism
about the public choice approach to takings clause jurisprudence,
although for different reasons than those outlined above. They note
first that the domain of "property rights," which are covered by the
takings clause, is much narrower than the domain of special interest
economic regulation. For example, a minimum wage statute might
qualify as an inefficient, socially harmful acquiescence to a narrow
special interest group, but it is difficult to attack minimum wage
statutes under our current conception of the takings clause. Indeed,
as Farber and Frickey note, any revision of the constitution to forbid all inefficient rent-seeking implies judicial review over a domain
7.
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and of an intensity that exceeds the current doctrine by a large order of magnitude. Carried to its logical conclusion, such a view
would require the near abdication of legislatures and agencies, and
would result in a form of government by judiciary which we have
not as yet seen.
On statutory interpretation, an important public choice story is
that statutory "intent," particularly insofar as it is contained in official legislative history, is largely manufactured. Legislative bodies
use it to rationalize or disguise what they are doing at least as often
as they use it to explain a statute's meaning. From this point one
can develop two different views about how the judge interpreting a
statute is to proceed. First, he should look to the natural meaning
of the language itself, and ignore other statements of statutory intent, including legislative history. Alternatively, the judge should
interpret the statute in such a fashion as to correct its public choice
biases. Farber and Frickey explore mainly the first; Sunstein's book
explores mostly the second.
Farber and Frickey note that the argument for discarding legislative history, Congressional reports, and other sources for a statute's meaning other than the statutory language itself makes sense,
if at all, when the statutory language is clear on its face. When that
language is ambiguous, then the statute may have no meaning apart
from the expressions of intent manifested in collateral documents.
In particular, the authors attack Justice Scalia's notion that, while
statutory language is often drafted in a public-regarding sense, legislators pack reports and other legislative history with all kinds of
statements favoring the particular special interests that have
claimed their souls. Justice Scalia apparently thinks this is a daily
occurrence. Farber and Frickey appear to believe that it virtually
never happens. One might easily presume the truth to be somewhere in the middle. Likewise, Farber and Frickey's argument that
the public choice case against legislative history "misfires" when
statutes are ambiguous does not adequately consider the argument
that statutory language may sometimes be intentionally made ambiguous in order to create consensus-the hope being that courts
will later look to the collateral documents to determine the statute's
true meaning.
Farber and Frickey mix an admirable understanding and sympathy for the contributions of public choice scholarship to jurisprudence with an appropriate skepticism about public choice's more
normative and far-ranging conclusions. On the one hand public
choice scholarship is sophisticated, its models are elegant, and
much of it seems to describe things that we observe daily in our
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highly imperfect political process. On the other hand, many public
choice theories do not stand up well under rigorous empirical testing. Legislatures in fact exhibit far more stability and far less chaos
than the Arrovian literature predicts. Although the theory of capture by special interest groups certainly accounts for some statutes,
it seems quite unable to account for others. The ideology of elected
representatives continues to be a better predictor of voting behavior
than economic self-interest or the desire to be re-elected. As Sunstein's book tellingly reveals, most of one's attitude toward regulation is predetermined by the baggage, whether liberal or
neoclassical, that one carries into the process. Public choicers have
convinced mainly themselves.
The lack of empirical robustness in the public choice literature
is critical for the legal policy maker, because he or she is interested
largely in applied public choice. An elegant model that simply fails
to account for the data is not of much use to someone who is looking at an existing institution and considering how to change it.
Both Sunstein and Farber and Frickey take what seems to be the
correct approach to this problem. If one is going to "apply" public
choice theory at all in the realm of legislative and agency decision
making, the application should be at the margin and not the center.
Nothing that public choice theory has established to date justifies
the wholesale abdication of legislative regulation in favor of the unregulated market, or even a substantial remodeling of our political
and administrative institutions. What public choice should encourage, however, is increased sensitivity to the possibility of capture and an approach to statutory interpretation designed to make
statutes reflect, as much as possible consistent with their language,
public rather than private interests. Farber and Frickey appear to
agree with this view. They conclude that "public choice can make a
real ... contribution to the legal system-not at the level of revolutionary new constitutional doctrines, but more modestly, by improving the implementation of existing statutes and the process for
enacting future legislation." For Farber and Frickey this premise
yields a case for a modest kind of judicial activism, which they characterize as nothing more than a "sensitivity to the forces that warp
political outcomes." This should lead judges to enforce "structural
and procedural constraints on those aspects of the democratic process that public choice suggests are most vulnerable to
malfunction."

